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THE INNATE PLASTICITY OF BODIES AND MINDS
Integrating Models of Genetic Determination 
and Environmental Formation
Robert Meunier and Valentine Reynaud*
Meunier / Reynaud Innate Plasticity
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
1 . Reverberations
In recent years, concepts of plasticity and epigenetics have gained cur-
rency in different areas of the life sciences, from evolutionary theory via 
developmental biology and neurobiology to medicine. The theoretical 
considerations attached to these terms and the experimental explora-
tion of the phenomena they refer to are seen as challenging gene-cen-
tred, reductionist approaches in biology and medicine and are thought 
to provide better-suited explanations for evolutionary change and nov-
elty, ontogenetic development, the functioning of the brain, and disease 
expression. It is their seemingly nondeterministic implications, or at 
least their acknowledgement of a multiplicity of causes, including envi-
ronmental factors, that gave these concepts credibility outside of biol-
ogy as well, in fields such as sociology, cultural studies, and new femi-
nist materialism.1 At least with respect to epigenetics, a veritable hype 
and an expanding set of expectations can be diagnosed, which has not 
only affected the life sciences, social sciences, and the humanities but 
also begun to shape the imagination of the public at large, mainly 
through considerable media coverage.2 
 Such biological concepts reverberate outside of their scientific 
realms, changing views on the body, the self, and their relation to the 
realms of agency, morality, and identity. On the other hand, as has hap-
pened to other developments in biology before, scientific results articu-
lated in terms of epigenetics and plasticity are shaped by constraints 
and expectations found in society. In this case, it is the increased indi-
vidualization of health concerns and the desire to control and improve 
the body in the absence of manifest pathological states, but also the 
* Both authors contributed equally to this article and appear in alphabetical order. 
We would like to thank the editors for their helpful suggestions.
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regulations of stem cell science and other factors, that enable and shape 
research, in particular in neurobiology and biomedicine. The life sci-
ences and society are thus entangled in a co-productive relationship, as 
scholars in science and technology studies (STS) have described on 
many occasions.3 
 We think that these larger questions about the relation between the 
respective sciences and culture/society motivate a closer exploration of 
the issues within the life and cognitive sciences. That is why in this arti-
cle we will focus neither on the interpretation of biological findings for 
a broader cultural understanding of the body or the self, nor on the 
social conditions for the research that brings them about. Instead, we 
wish to ask primarily how plasticity and epigenetics relate to some 
notions in biology that they are often taken to oppose, such as genetic 
determination, genetic programme, and innateness.
2 . Conflict or Complementarity?
Although the critique of genetic determinism is as old as the notion of 
genes playing a somehow more prominent role in heredity, develop-
ment, and evolution than other factors, a gene-centred view of biology 
prevails, and it often takes the form of strong genetic determinism. This 
has many reasons, some epistemic, some practical, and some political. 
On the epistemic side, genes and the associated molecular mechanisms 
provide simple explanations in terms of bottom-up causal pathways 
within a framework of a clear-cut hierarchy of biological organization 
from molecules to ecosystems; in contrast, the environment, with its 
multiplicity of causal aspects on various layers of organization, seems 
particularly hard to conceptualize in a coherent manner. Based on that 
epistemic presupposition, pragmatic and political agendas in contexts 
from agriculture to health and disease are often characterized by a rhet-
oric of control that requires the possibility of naming the causes; these 
agendas in turn favour the kind of research that supports such causal 
narratives. The notion of genetic risk associated with certain diseases is 
an obvious example.4
 Criticism of gene-centred views or genetic determinism has been 
elaborated from many perspectives, including biology, psychology, lin-
guistics, philosophy, history, STS, and feminism, among others. Lately, 
much of the most productive criticism, offering conceptual alternatives, 
has accumulated around the terms ‘plasticity’ and ‘epigenetics’. These 
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two terms have different histories, different fields of application, and, 
for sure, quite distinct meanings. Nevertheless, they both point to the 
significance of the environment in development. While epigenetics 
emphasizes the way the internal and external environment of cells inter-
venes on a molecular level, in particular by regulating the expression of 
genes, plasticity points to the product of environmental variation by 
referring to the phenotypic variation (i.e., variation in any property of 
an individual — morphological or mental — that is considered from a 
biological point of view) induced by environmental changes. With 
respect to epigenetics, a terminological shift occurred. Today, epi-
genetics denotes the molecular mechanisms by which a cell acquires a 
structural or functional state and by which this state is transmitted in a 
cell lineage, also across generations. These mechanisms include those 
that mediate environmental factors and are thus underlying plasticity. 
(This more narrow notion will be discussed below in section II.) The 
term ‘epigenetics’ was introduced, however, by Conrad Waddington in 
the 1940s in a much broader sense as ‘the branch of biology which 
studies the causal interactions between genes and their products, which 
bring the phenotype into being’.5 This meaning prevails especially in 
the debates on innateness that will be the subject of section III.
 In the following section of this article, we characterize the biologi-
cal content of the concepts of plasticity and epigenetics and discuss 
some of the issues that they are supposed to reform by offering alterna-
tives with respect to standard gene-centred views of evolution and 
development. In section III, we approach the theme through the lens of 
innateness ascriptions, mainly in cognitive science. In both cases, we 
arrive at the conclusion that while notions of plasticity and epigenetics 
seem to oppose genetic determinism or innateness by pointing to the 
role of environment, the plasticity of morphological and cognitive 
development requires not a homogeneous material that is formed by the 
environment but rather a number of specific resources and mechanisms 
in order to occur. From this perspective, epigenetic regulation appears 
to mediate between variable environmental inputs and relatively stable 
genetic material. The plastic response to environmental factors is 
enabled and articulated in developmental routines. The latter are acti-
vated by epigenetic mechanisms and exhibit stability provided by the 
specificity embodied in genetic material and basic capacities to learn, 
which can be characterized as innate.
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I I .  G E N E - C E N T R I S M ,  P H E N O T Y P I C  P L A S T I C I T Y ,  A N D 
E P I G E N E T I C S  I N  B I O L O G Y
1 . Gene-Centred Biology
To understand why the theories clustering around the notions of epi-
genetics and plasticity are hailed as revolutionary or as facilitating new 
unified views in neuroscience and evolutionary biology, it is important 
to understand what they revolt against, or from what they were 
excluded before. The target for the rhetoric of overcoming, which is 
prevalent in these research fields and even more so in other discourses 
drawing on such research, is represented by gene-centred views of evo-
lution and development in biology. The ‘received view’ of evolutionary 
theory was largely developed in the 1930s and is often referred to as the 
modern synthesis of genetics and Darwinian evolutionary theory; it 
conceives of evolution as natural selection of gradual, hereditary varia-
tion, where only the genetic material is considered to be inherited.6 In 
contrast, biologists today emphasize the role of plasticity, epigenetics, 
and niche construction in the process of evolution (a trend sometimes 
referred to as ‘extended synthesis’).7 What is challenged by these new 
views with respect to development is the deterministic notion of the 
genome as a programme or blueprint of an organism.8 Plasticity and 
epigenetics in this context give space to account for the role of environ-
ment in development.
 In line with the received view of evolution, Hull et al. have pro-
vided a general account of selection that applies also to somatic selec-
tion processes; they define selection as ‘repeated cycles of replication, 
variation, and environmental interaction so structured that environ-
mental interaction causes replication to be differential’.9 According to 
this account ‘selection is two processes, not one’.10 The two processes 
are replication, which can involve variation, and environmental interac-
tion, which refers to the interactions of an organism with its organic 
and inorganic environments insofar as they influence the reproductive 
success of the organism. The formulation of selection as entailing two 
processes is meant to dissolve misunderstandings concerning the units 
of selection. According to Hull et al, genes are the units of replication 
and organisms are the units of interaction. Thus they are both units of 
selection. 
 Variation is thus located on the level of the gene and depicted as 
due to occasional random events — mutation and recombination — 
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that interfere with the developmental processes and provide the 
resources for change. This genetic variation can cause phenotypic varia-
tion, which in turn affects the environmental interaction of individual 
organisms, leading to more or less reproductive success compared with 
individuals of the same species that do not exhibit this genetic varia-
tion, and thus to an increase or decrease of frequency within a popula-
tion of this genetic variation and the phenotypic variation it brings 
about. As Lindley Darden and Joseph A. Cain have pointed out, envi-
ronmental interaction is the actual step of selection.11 Phenotypic varia-
tion leads to differential reproduction in that the organisms interact 
with the environment and some benefit due to the phenotypic variation 
they exhibit. The concept of an adaptation encapsulates the idea that 
phenotypic traits are selected for beneficial interaction with the envi-
ronment. Adaptation refers to an environmental interaction that is 
already fixed due to its beneficial effect, but new phenotypic variation 
might induce many new causal interactions for selection to operate on. 
As Darden and Cain have pointed out, discussions on the nature of 
selection mainly focuses ‘on the effects of selection, namely differential 
survival and reproduction’.12 The actual causal nature of the interaction 
is not taken into account, and accordingly, there is no account of how 
new phenotypic variation comes about, is shaped by the environment, 
or becomes fixed in individual development. The only question that is 
answered in the received view is how the distribution of a phenotypic 
variation becomes fixed in a population. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed below, the conventional view cannot explain novelty in evolu-
tion.
 A gene-centred perspective on development is inscribed in both the 
question of differential gene expression and the suggestion of a genetic 
programme as its solution. If genes are the primary cause of develop-
ment, with environmental factors providing merely the right conditions 
for genes to act but not containing any information themselves, then 
the question arises how a complex organism, consisting of many differ-
ent cell types, can arise from a fertilized egg, given that all cells contain 
the whole genome. The answer to this question that molecular biolo-
gists came to provide is that in the determination or performance of 
every cell type, a special set of genes is expressed. This is referred to as 
differential gene expression, and it leaves ample space for environmen-
tal factors to act. And yet as Evelyn Fox Keller has shown, differential 
gene expression quickly became associated with genetic regulation in 
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the early days of molecular biology, in particular through the work of 
François Jacob and Jacques Monod in the 1960s.13 These researchers 
distinguished structural and regulatory genes, the former performing 
the tasks that make a cell specific, the latter being responsible for turn-
ing on or off the production of the former. Jacob and Monod described 
a mechanism for this type of gene-based regulation. As Keller has com-
mented, ‘By calling these mechanisms “genetic regulatory mechanisms” 
and not “mechanisms of gene regulation”, they implied that such mech-
anisms are themselves genetic, laying to rest any notion that genes 
might rely on non-genetic factors for instructions as to when and where 
to act’.14 Or if such non-genetic factors act, they cannot be more than 
triggering cues; they do not contain the kind of information thought to 
be necessary for development to occur. In this context, Jacob and 
Monod also introduced the metaphor of a genetic programme that 
together with the notion of a genetic code was borrowed from the 
equally new discipline of computer science.15 This paradigm has been 
expressed by an eminent investigator of genetic regulation as follows:
The sequence content, arrangement, and other aspects of the organiza-
tion of these modular control elements [of the genome] are the heritage 
of each species. They contain the sequence-specific code for develop-
ment; and they determine the particular outcome of developmental pro-
cesses and thus the form of the animal produced by every embryo.16
The notions of a genetic programme, code, or blueprint determining 
the development of organisms, with the environment being relegated to 
providing the right conditions or necessary triggers for the programme 
to execute itself or for the blueprint to instruct its own fulfilment, came 
about due to the regularity and stability of developmental processes, 
even under considerable fluctuation of environmental conditions. How-
ever, this view of development has been subject to harsh critique from 
many authors in psychology, biology, and philosophy in the last thirty 
or so years. It seems that these notions beg the question, insofar as it 
remains to be specified how the genome can function as an instruction 
with these properties of self-determination and the determination of a 
complex process. As the psychologist Susan Oyama, one of the earlier 
and much received critics of informational metaphors in biology has 
written, ‘The point of the blueprint analogy, though, does not seem to 
be to illuminate developmental processes but rather to assume them 
and, in celebrating their regularity, to impute cognitive functions to the 
 
 I N N AT E  P L A S T I C I T Y
157
genes.’17 More specifically, the notion of a programme does not seem 
well suited to explaining the spatio-temporal patterning of events. The 
biologist H. Frederik Nijhout has noted that ‘a program must somehow 
contain information about the temporal sequence of events’:
This criterion is never met. Development is a series of elaborate tempo-
ral and spatial interactions that are context dependent. The sequence of 
gene activation we see in development is an emergent property of this 
interaction.18 
To summarize, it can be said that to explain phenotypic change and 
especially the origin of novelties, evolutionary theory requires more 
than what is acknowledged in standard conceptions of natural selection 
and development through differential gene expression. In other words, 
what is required is an account of how genetic change translates into 
phenotypic change and how environmental interaction plays a causal 
role in this process. In question is the role of the environment, not only 
as selective agent but also in actually shaping the phenotype during 
development. (In fact, such development never ends, since adult organ-
isms also employ genetic resources according to their environmental sit-
uations and subsequently undergo permanent changes.) 
2 . Phenotypic Plasticity and the Problem of Evolutionary Novelty
Many scholars in evo-devo — the field, broadly conceived, that 
attempts to integrate evolutionary and developmental biology — 
emphasize the limits of the received view as a gene-centred theory of 
evolution. One recurring argument is that it does not provide an expla-
nation for evolutionary novelty:
The immediate obstacle that arises once we consider novelties as “quali-
tatively distinct” from existing traits is that the [modern synthesis] tells 
us how traits spread in natural populations (by natural selection, drift, 
etc.) but is silent on how they arise — except in the trivial case of quan-
titative variants of already existing features.19
Mary Jane West-Eberhard has mentioned that the modern synthesis 
misses an account of environmental induction of novelties, of mecha-
nisms that explain how mutations translate into phenotypes, and of 
large-scale variants, i.e. novelties that do not arise gradually.20 While 
authors have differed in their definition of novelty, most mention that 
the feature in question should be qualitatively different from the fea-
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tures present in the organism before, not just a quantitative extension 
of a given feature, like a longer neck, for instance. One definition that 
suits the given purpose has been provided by West-Eberhard: ‘An evolu-
tionary novelty can be defined as a discrete phenotypic trait that is new 
in composition or context of expression relative to established ances-
tral traits.’21
 According to West-Eberhard, novelty arises when ‘a novel input or 
initiator impinges on some individuals’ in a population of genetically 
and phenotypically varying organisms.22 The novel input can be either a 
mutation or a change in the environment, and it ‘induces some novel 
developmental response’.23 The point with respect to mutation is that it 
is not necessarily the immediate effects of a mutation but different 
responses of the developmental system — including the expression of 
non-mutated genes due to this change in the genetic context — that 
produce novelties. But it can also be an environmental factor that occa-
sions a differential response of the whole system. This is what is referred 
to as developmental plasticity: a different phenotypic outcome on the 
basis of the same or almost the same genome or cellular starting condi-
tions in different organisms, in the face of a change on the level of the 
genome, the cell, or the environment of the organism, to which the 
whole system reacts differently. West-Eberhard has illustrated this 
notion with the following example, though it has more pedagogical vir-
tue in illustrating her point than epistemic significance in the study of 
evolution.24 In 1942, the zoologist Everhard Johannes Slijper reported 
the case of a goat that was born with a congenital deformation and 
paralysis of its forelegs but nevertheless learned to move on its hind legs 
alone. It is important to note that it does not matter whether the goat’s 
deformity came about through mutation or environmental factors 
(although the latter is more likely). The goat’s attempts to move 
(towards food and fellow goats) with the use of only two legs consti-
tuted a different input for the developmental processes as they typically 
occur in goats. The plasticity of the growth process led to a shaping of 
body parts that suited the goat’s idiosyncratic way of moving (with 
respect to other goats). On dissection it was found that the hip, the 
spine and many other bones and muscles were very different in shape 
from those of other goats, and actually more like those of other bipedal 
mammals. Additionally, a set of tendons was observed that even repre-
sented a completely novel trait (in the sense of a novel context of expres-
sion, according to the definition above). This kind of response is pheno-
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typic accommodation — it exhibits not only plasticity but adaptive 
plasticity. 
 What these observations of the deformed goat show is that the 
shape of the hip, for instance, is not determined by genetic make-up. 
Developmental processes are selected to produce a certain outcome 
under certain conditions. If the conditions change, they may produce 
something different, without being altered by mutation. Let’s assume 
that a novel environmental influence affects a whole population due to, 
say, some abrupt climatic or geological change or the migration of the 
whole population. Then, because of the phenotypic and genetic varia-
tion, individuals will produce different novel phenotypes in response to 
the new conditions, which in turn differ with respect to the degree to 
which they support the changed lifestyle in that very environment. 
There would be some organisms that accommodate better to the new 
circumstances than others, and they will reproduce more and pass on 
the genetic make-up that is supportive for the new conditions — that is, 
the genotype that produces the most beneficial developmental response. 
If the environmental influence persists and is in that sense also inher-
ited, in the next generation there will be more individuals that exhibit 
the beneficial response. So in the first step, there is a selection of the 
variations that produce better adaptive responses. Note, however, that 
this is not merely a selection of the genetic variants that produces more 
adapted phenotypes but a selection of the genetic variants that allow 
for adaptive developmental responses in the face of a novel environ-
ment. But if the new input were to be removed, the old phenotype 
would still recur. If it persists further, genetic accommodation would 
occur, i.e., ‘the genetic response that is expected whenever a polygenic 
novel or established trait comes under a new regime of natural selec-
tion’.25 New mutations or recombinations that appear would have a dif-
ferent value than in the situation before the novel input. They will be 
selected when they support the new phenotype, or rather the develop-
mental processes that bring it about. In this way, after some time, the 
new phenotype will become more and more refined, and the genetic 
material will change to an extent that the old phenotype would not 
reappear if the formerly novel environmental input were removed. We 
can say that the new phenotype becomes canalized.26 
 Genetic selection thus comes in two steps: phenotypic and genetic 
accommodation. Phenotypic accommodation is not due to random 
responses to an environmental change that could be adaptive or not but 
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rather consists of directed adaptation. The goat case illustrates this. 
The altered hip shape and the new set of tendons were induced by the 
environment to which they constitute an adaptation. The environment 
thus can be said to contain specific developmental information. While 
this process corresponds to views that have been labelled Lamarckian, 
the hypothesis of genetic assimilation makes clear that long-term evolu-
tion relies on the genetic basis of development and its replicatory fea-
tures. The genotypic changes that improve the non-genetic novelty or 
make it more robust to environmental fluctuations become fixed 
through selection. This theory of evolutionary change is thus not at 
odds with classical Darwinism. It just puts more weight on environ-
mental influence and on phenotypic plasticity. In a way, the phenotype 
takes the lead in evolution, while the genetic material follows — but 
evolution still consists of genetic change. 
 Of course, evolution rarely moves in such big steps as in the goat 
example, and West-Eberhard does not suggest that bipedalism in 
humans, for instance, originated in one such event. But the principle is 
scalable, and smaller changes with smaller effects might bring about 
novelties (though West-Eberhard does not exclude the occurrence of 
large-scale variants). The goat example further illustrates that in 
response to a new input, many changes in different traits may occur in 
an orchestrated manner, which leads to large changes in the organism.
3 . Epigenetics and the Molecularization of Environmental Effects
The term ‘epigenetics’ most generally refers to the mechanisms of gene 
regulation in a cell. At any given moment in the life of an organism, 
gene expression is governed by the molecular conditions in the cell. As 
mentioned above, regulatory mechanisms and networks have been 
studied since the early days of molecular biology, with the operon 
model suggested by Jacob and Monod in 1962 as a paradigm case, 
leading to complex wiring diagrams of gene regulatory systems.27 Gene 
regulation is dependent on products of earlier expression of genes (the 
transcription of parts of the genome to functional RNA molecules and 
the translation of some RNA in proteins) either in the same cell or in 
other cells, in the case of signalling molecules that can travel between 
cells. Furthermore, in early development, RNA and proteins, which are 
already expressed in the gametes (sperm and egg) at the point of fertil-
ization, regulate gene expression. These gene products act through sev-
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eral mechanisms, some of which operate on the level of DNA, facilitat-
ing or blocking translation; some manipulate already expressed RNA 
molecules or proteins that might themselves be involved in regulation.
 These aspects of gene regulation still fit well within the older para-
digm of a genetic programme executing itself. But it has become 
increasingly clear in the last few years that the very packaging of DNA 
as well as several other aspects of the biochemical and physical condi-
tions in and around the cell influence regulation. Here, another aspect 
of gene regulation comes in that can involve other molecules and meta-
bolic processes beyond RNA and proteins. These mediate the influence 
of food digestion and other environmental factors on a molecular level. 
Therefore, much work under the heading of epigenetics now puts more 
emphasis on the influence of the environment in development and phys-
iological processes, in particular the shaping of individual variation 
with respect to various characters, including pathologies — in short, on 
the role of environmental regulatory factors in the plasticity of organ-
isms. Plasticity as discussed above points to the effects of environmen-
tal influence, but epigenetics emphasizes the molecular mechanisms 
that mediate environmental factors and cellular processes. What is par-
ticularly interesting is that cases have been experimentally confirmed 
and mechanisms have been elucidated that show how environmental 
influence can be inherited, even if the environmental aspect that intro-
duced a change does not affect later generations. Eva Jablonka and Gal 
Raz have called this ‘transgenerational epigenetic inheritance’.28 It is the 
last two aspects of epigenetics, the influence of individual environments 
on a molecular level and the possibility of the inheritance of its effects, 
that constitute for many — biologists as much as other commentators 
— the most interesting and challenging developments in current epigen-
etic studies. Let us therefore characterize epigenetic inheritance systems 
in some more detail. 
 While epigenetic inheritance in a broad sense can include inheri-
tance through recurring developmental interactions between mother 
and offspring, social learning, and symbolic communication,29 there is 
also a more specific concept of cellular epigenetic inheritance. It refers 
to ‘the transmission from mother cell to daughter cell of variations that 
are not the result of differences in DNA base sequence and/or the pres-
ent environment’.30 Two epigenetic inheritance systems for multicellular 
organisms are the transmission in cell division of molecules that are 
attached to DNA or to proteins that package and order DNA on the 
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one hand and of regulatory RNAs on the other. These mechanisms can 
explain how differentiated cells give rise to identical daughter cells even 
if the signal that initiated differentiation is gone. But even more inter-
esting is cellular transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. In such cases, 
‘The environment may induce epigenetic variation by directly affecting 
the germline or by affecting germ cells through the mediation of the 
soma, but, in either case, subsequent transmission is through the germ-
line.’31 As Maurizio Meloni and Giuseppe Testa have commented in ref-
erence to August Weismann, who introduced the distinction between 
soma and germline that underlies a gene-centred perspective in biology, 
‘The epigenetic body brings the Weismannian body to an end.’32
4 . Plasticity, Epigenetics, and Genetic Specificity
There is of course still much to be said about the developmental pro-
cesses that allow for plasticity. West-Eberhard has emphasized that 
existing processes and structures are expressed in different places or at 
different points in development: ‘The origin of novelty is reorganiza-
tional, a product of reexpression of preexisting sets of genes.’33 The new 
tendons in the aforementioned goat, for instance, grew by employing 
the molecular and developmental mechanisms that are usually involved 
in growing tendons in other places in typical goats. Gerd Müller has 
also noted novelties arising from ‘the redeployment of any of these com-
ponents [molecular or developmental modes and interactions] at new 
locations, through subdivision or combination of earlier structures, or 
through developmental individualization of a serial structure’.34 Marc 
Kirschner and John Gerhart, discussing the notion of evolvability, have 
mentioned exploratory processes: nerves and blood vessels, for instance, 
grow in a random manner and become established only when they 
receive the right signal; otherwise they get reduced again.35 In this way, 
they can easily accommodate changes in, say, appendages, without the 
need ‘to wait for the right mutation’ to programme growth in the new 
regions. The picture that emerges from these points is that the plasticity 
of development requires stable developmental routines that are invari-
ant to the environmental influence bringing about the plastic response, 
and thus the routines appear as quite determined. 
 Turning to epigenetics again, we can observe that epigenetic 
research can hardly be described in Kuhnian (i.e., strongly discontinu-
ous) terms of revolutionary developments in science. And the extent to 
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which findings in epigenetics change the picture in biology is unsurpris-
ingly subject to controversy,36 since every sensitivity to environmental 
input seems after all to presuppose some genetic condition, and every 
change it may bring about is mediated by genes or their immediate 
products. There must be proteins that set and remove epigenetic modifi-
cations of the genome, and after all, the effect of the latter is achieved 
by allowing or blocking the transcription of genes. The opposition to 
gene-centrism might thus rather appear as a Gestalt switch or as a 
change of emphasis in the relation of genes and environment, the exis-
tence of which has always been acknowledged. However, a different 
perspective and parsing of phenomena will result in alternative deci-
sions and activities and finally will make research take different direc-
tions. Even if one wishes to argue that the gene-centred view of biology 
remains untouched in the light of epigenetics, epigenetic research has 
clearly extended the range of studies on gene regulation and shifted the 
focus on environment and individual variation in some fields, especially 
biomedicine. We can, however, be less reserved concerning the changes 
in biology and observe that a conceptual shift has taken place such that 
the genome is viewed less as a programme and more as a reactive 
agent.37 Still, it seems that the elucidation of the mechanisms of envi-
ronmental influence on gene expression does not diminish the role of 
genes in facilitating specific responses to these environmental inputs. In 
the following, we will start from the concept of innateness and its cri-
tique in terms of plasticity and epigenetics to arrive at a similar conclu-
sion.
I I I .  I N N A T E N E S S ,  P H E N O T Y P I C  P L A S T I C I T Y ,  A N D 
E P I G E N E T I C S  I N  T H E  C O G N I T I V E  S C I E N C E S
Usually, innateness is associated with determinism, fixity, or robust-
ness. A trait is said to be innate when its development is genetically 
specified, when it develops in large sets of environments, or when it is 
buffered against environmental variations. Innateness understood in 
this way is not consistent with what seems to be characteristic of organ-
isms: phenotypic plasticity. Organisms possess the capacity to adapt to 
environmental variations in developing alternative phenotypes. Because 
the plasticity of organisms seems to imply that every trait is acquired 
and not innate, some researchers hold that this concept is superfluous 
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and should be rejected.38 However, this picture turns out to be too sim-
plistic when one inquires into the position of nativists, that is, of philos-
ophers and cognitive scientists who claim that the mind is endowed 
with innate faculties. Indeed, while they maintain that the faculties of 
the mind are innate, they never deny the necessary intervention of the 
environment in the development of these traits. For example, when 
Noam Chomsky talks about an innate faculty of language, he does not 
mean that language can develop without linguistic environment.39 He 
claims only that this environment does not provide all the information 
needed for language development to occur. Thus, even within a nativist 
framework, language development remains a plastic phenomenon, since 
it depends on the specific environment in which it occurs. This is evi-
denced by the diversity of languages that human beings are able to 
learn, depending on the particular linguistic environments in which 
they live. With this in mind, it is worth asking how exactly innateness 
and plasticity should be articulated in order to understand their com-
plementary character.
1 . Two Arguments Invoking Plasticity in Order to Dismiss Innateness
Plasticity has been invoked in two ways to dismiss innateness ascrip-
tions. First, it has been used generally to reject innateness as a scientific 
concept. Second, it has been used specifically, as in the case of brain 
plasticity, to show that most traits are acquired and not innate. 
a) The Broader Argument about the Complexity of Ontogeny
The complexity of ontogeny is used by developmental system theorists 
to highlight the problematic meaning of ‘genetic specification’, which 
underlies the notion of innateness.40 Indeed, when researchers talk 
about ‘innate traits’ they generally mean ‘genetically specified traits’.41 
For example, Chomsky holds that innate universal grammar is geneti-
cally specified.42 But it is very difficult to give a satisfactory definition 
of genetic specification, since it is either too strong or too weak. This is 
due to the epigenetic dimension of development. 
 As said in the introductory section of this article, ‘epigenetics’ can 
be understood in two ways. We discussed above the narrow sense of 
epigenetics as the control of gene activity by molecular mechanisms. In 
a broad sense, epigenetics is a bridge between genotype and phenotype 
showing that there are triadic interactions between gene, organism, and 
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environment and emphasizing the complex and emergent character of 
development. In both cases, epigenetics is a reaction against the insuffi-
ciency of genetics,43 insofar as epigenetics highlights either the specific 
inability to offer plausible mechanisms of the control of gene activity in 
development or the general incapacity to explain the genesis of the phe-
notype from the genotype. These incapacities of standard views of 
genetic information or gene action become obvious in the face of the 
plasticity of development, i.e., the sensitivity to internal and external 
environments, which is addressed by epigenetics. 
 Every phenotypic trait is the joint product of genes and environ-
ment. This ‘interactionist consensus’ centres around the belief that 
every trait is somehow the expression of the genome in a specific envi-
ronment.44 Ontogeny results from the complex combination between 
interacting genotypic causes and environmental causes. But boundaries 
between both types of causality are very difficult to draw. As noticed 
earlier, among causal factors, some are epigenetic — they control and 
regulate gene activity. Every genomic expression, because it is depen-
dent on epigenetic factors, is contextual. Boundaries of genes are 
moved:45 a gene becomes the whole formed by coding sequences and 
regulating signals. Then environmental influences in early infancy can 
alter epigenetic processes and thus change the expression of individual 
DNA.
 Nevertheless, for Paul Griffiths, the ‘interactionist consensus’ 
encapsulates two wrong ideas about development.46 First, it divides 
causes of development into two symmetrical causes — genes and envi-
ronment. Second, it implicitly advocates that genes are predominant for 
explanation. Developmental systems theory refuses to treat genes as a 
special factor with predominant causal role in development. The epi-
genetic character of development forces us to recognize the dependence 
of individual ontogeny vis-à-vis multiple ‘developmental resources’.47 
The ‘parity thesis’ asserts the same significance of all developmental 
resources in development.48 It recognizes the intervention of multiple 
interacting developmental resources in a self-organized, plastic, and 
contingent process. Some of these developmental resources are genetic. 
Others include non-genetic components as varied as the cytoplasm of a 
zygote or social events. Furthermore, major resources are provided by 
early stages of the developmental process itself.
 In this perspective, innateness is viewed as an inadequate concept 
that cannot account for the complexity of ontogeny. The notion of 
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innateness would always imply the predominance of one causal factor, 
i.e., the genetic factor, which, however, according to this line of cri-
tique, is not separable from other causes. Innateness ascriptions, then, 
promote a static vision of development. Carrying a too restrictive vision 
of causality, innateness fails to apply adequately to development, which 
seems to involve different components, operations, and interactions and 
is fundamentally plastic. The consequence seems to be that the notion 
of innateness impairs the study of development. 
 However, this general argument, which employs epigenetics or 
plasticity in order to dismiss innateness, is relevant only for an account 
of innateness that relies on a dominant causal factor. But it appears that 
every trait is the product of several factors, including innate factors. It 
results from reciprocal interactions between varied elements of the 
developmental system. Thus, reference to epigenetics or plasticity does 
not justify dismissing innateness. Innateness can be compatible with a 
non-restrictive view of causality in an adequate account of develop-
ment. Innate endowment of organisms would refer to a repertory of 
endogenous developmental resources that can interact with other devel-
opmental resources to produce phenotypic traits. As a developmental 
resource among others, innate mechanisms or constraints have no 
explanatory priority.
b) The Specific Argument Based on Brain Plasticity 
Another anti-nativist trend purports to show that neural plasticity con-
tradicts the hypothesis of innate knowledge.49 Neural plasticity is a spe-
cial kind of plasticity, since it reveals the ability of a unique genotype to 
produce more than one phenotype.50 According to the neurobiological 
argument based on brain plasticity, the extreme plasticity of the brain 
during cortical development makes the existence of innate cognitive 
structures highly improbable. The human brain is a plastic organ, in its 
development and in its functioning. More precisely, the plasticity of the 
human brain points to two things: the significance of environmental 
stimulation in shaping neural circuitry, and the capacity of the brain to 
reorganize itself and accomplish the same tasks in different ways. 
 Steven Quartz and Terrence Sejnowski have shown that fundamen-
tal aspects of neural organization develop in a manner that is highly 
sensitive to the environment.51 Neural plasticity enables us to learn effi-
ciently in unpredictable environments. Ontogenetic sculpture of neuro-
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nal connections depending on experience is a major aspect of cerebral 
growth during infancy. For example, when the brain is deprived of 
visual stimulation because one eye is kept closed, this eye will end up 
functionally blind. Environmental stimulations play a major role in 
shaping cortical circuitry. At the same time, the cortical system has 
more than one way to form specialized circuitry. The realized pathway 
is probably never the same in two individuals. Different environments 
imply different neural organizations, even in the case of similar starting 
points. These differences are deep and exist at a variety of scales. Thus, 
learning capacities are not ‘stationary’.52 The very ways that humans 
learn change as long as learning takes place. Minds have contingent but 
stable features: they develop in some circumstances but persist once 
they are developed. The system possesses a kind of cortical memory, 
i.e., the repeating exposure to the same inputs consolidates the special-
ization of the circuitry. 
 Furthermore, to accomplish the same tasks, we use different brain 
areas at different ages. Brain plasticity is also the capacity of brain 
regions to fulfil different functions, to reconfigure themselves in 
response to environmental demands. When a cortical region changes its 
function (for example, after the amputation or lesion of a part), it does 
so not by creating new connections but by activating latent connections 
that were inactive until this point. Functional properties of neurons of 
the cerebral cortex are dynamical, modifying themselves constantly 
under the effect of experience.53 Brains continue to grow and reorganize 
themselves continuously in response to environmental input. 
 In a nutshell, specialized cortical circuitry seems to emerge from 
interaction with environment without being guided by innate rules. For 
David J. Buller, learning is strictly conditioned by interactions between 
endogenous activity of the brain and patterns of environmental stim-
uli.54 The precise patterns of environmental stimuli to which the devel-
oping cortex is exposed play a major role in the shaping of brain cir-
cuitry and their functional properties. Environmental inputs shape fine-
grained structures by a selection of cells. Neural plasticity shapes 
adaptive complex cognitive structures without genetic specification.55 
As connections change and cells die, domain-specific competences, e.g., 
competences that are dedicated to fulfil specific tasks, must emerge as 
an a posteriori product. The contingency of the connection patterns 
seems to reveal the absence of predetermination and thus of innateness. 
In this perspective, if mind specialization is a posteriori shaped by envi-
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ronment, innate knowledge is not necessary for learning, and the mind 
does not contain genetically specified, i.e., innate, faculties. Specialized 
cortical circuits are built solely by the plastic interaction between the 
brain and its local environment. 
 The two arguments discussed suggest that ascriptions of innateness 
and the plasticity of traits, such as mental faculties, contradict each 
other. In the following sections, we argue for a way that innateness can 
nonetheless be reconciled with plasticity, especially with respect to 
learning.
2 . Why Plasticity Needs Innateness
Our main argument is that plasticity does not imply that everything is 
possible and, further, that innateness is a useful concept for addressing 
the factors that limit the number of possible outcomes of a process.
a) Plasticity Does Not Rule Out Innateness
Some constructivist accounts reconcile notions of acquired and innate 
traits. For example, Annette Karmiloff-Smith has held a constructivist 
account of language development.56 In her view, linguistic knowledge 
results from an epigenetic process: it progressively constructs itself 
during development. But this development still requires innate linguistic 
predispositions that orientate or at least allow for the further construc-
tion of specific linguistic representations. As in morphological develop-
ment (discussed above), the influence of environmental factors as stud-
ied in epigenetics needs genetic specificity. Furthermore, environmental 
interaction and even learning is always under genetic control: neural 
cell stimulation triggers the expression of genes, which either directly 
modifies the structure and function of synapses or triggers the expres-
sion of other genes. Even those who highlight the epigenetic dimension 
of development usually accept the significance of genes and the neces-
sity of constraints, and these constraints, we argue, can be considered 
innate. Franck Ramus has commented:
Plasticity, and brain plasticity in particular, has a meaning only within 
strict genetic control: Ironically, plasticity is among the properties of the 
brain that must be under the tightest genetic control. [...] In a nutshell, 
plasticity is not an alternative to the genome, indeed it is entirely con-
trolled by the genome.57 
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Brain plasticity is not the shaping of an initially unformed mass under 
the effects of environment. The cortex does possess an intrinsic struc-
ture.58 The paradigmatic example of plasticity, namely the column of 
ocular dominance, illustrates this: in a first phase, columns are formed 
under genetic control without the need of visual stimulations. In 
macaques, this has been shown to happen even before birth. The criti-
cal period during which there is plasticity comes afterwards (e.g., if one 
eye is permanently closed, the column will disappear). And even here, 
the mechanisms employed for building structures in a plastic and 
responsive manner need to be in place. At the end of this period, the 
system becomes buffered against environmental stimulations. The point 
is that neural tissues are not similar to substances that can take what-
ever form, for example, modelling clay. 
b) The Necessity of Initial Constraints in Learning: Irreducible Mini-
mal Nativism
When we turn from brain structure to the capacity to learn, it appears 
that instead of an opposition, there is complementarity between innate 
constraints and learning. Even learning requires some innate mecha-
nisms.59 James Gould and Peter Marler have held, ‘The animal is 
innately equipped to recognize when it should learn, what cues it should 
attend to, how to store the new information and how to refer to it in the 
future.’60 These ‘instincts to learn’ are located within the interaction 
between genome and environment. Even the most arbitrary culturally 
transmitted behaviour might be the result of an ‘instinct’, not in its spe-
cific expression of course, but with respect to the ability to acquire it. 
What is in question is not the existence of these instincts but rather 
their nature and their mechanisms. Each species of bird, for example, 
learns songs in a way that suits their nature. Within each, innate speci-
fications contribute to song acquisition without obviating the need of 
learning. 
 At this point, a caveat is in order. Nativism, strictly speaking, has 
to be distinguished from the use of the concept of innateness. Nativism 
is a specific view of mind structure, a specific view of what has to be 
innate. It posits the existence of innate domain-specific faculties, which 
constitutes a very strong claim. But even an empiricist account of mind 
structure — i.e., an account that claims that the mind is not endowed 
with innate domain-specific faculties — needs a concept of innateness 
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and thus needs to admit a minimal nativism.61 An empiricist has to pos-
tulate at least the existence of innate learning mechanisms or capaci-
ties.62 Even Buller, who defends a radical anti-nativist account, has 
admitted the existence of initial tendencies in the mind that orientate 
attention on relevant environmental inputs. Learning is helped by these 
initial biases that make the organism aware of stimuli. These few initial 
biases are the head-starts of learning. Thus, the difference between 
strict nativism and anti-nativism does not deal with the existence of 
innate structure but with its nature: is it composed of domain-specific 
capacities or of general-purpose learning mechanisms? As Carruthers 
has remarked, ‘The real debate about language acquisition is not about 
whether a nativist model is correct but rather about which sort of nativ-
ist model is correct.’63
 Strict nativists see the mind as the product of a relatively large 
number of innately specified, relatively complex, domain-specific struc-
tures and processes. Empiricists see the mind as a set of general-pur-
pose learning mechanisms.64 Empiricism does not dismiss all innate-
ness. It rejects only specific innate content. Accordingly, we can defend 
the concept of innateness without necessarily adopting a strict nativist 
account.
3 . What Kind of Innateness is Compatible with Plasticity?
Plasticity, then, needs innateness, but innateness, to be compatible with 
plasticity, should not be understood as determinism, fixity, or robust-
ness of specific outcomes of development or learning. Constructivists 
have adopted the notion of innate ‘biases’ to make innateness compati-
ble with plasticity. Innate biases allow for plastic responses since they 
do not contain in themselves the final state of development,65 but they 
orientate development in a sense, since they refer to an innate endow-
ment that enables the organism to reach some content within a specific 
range of possibilities. As noted earlier, Karmiloff-Smith has proposed a 
model of acquisition of knowledge that requires linguistic predisposi-
tions guiding the progressive construction of specific linguistic repre-
sentations. But the construction process goes much beyond what the 
linguistic predispositions are about. It is a process of ‘reiterative repre-
sentational re-description’ during which implicit information in the 
mind progressively becomes more explicit for the consciousness. In this 
model, development is much more than the mere unfolding of innate 
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content. And initial biases (linguistic predispositions) largely differ 
from the final state (linguistic knowledge). Therefore, they are neither a 
set of innate grammatical rules nor a mere general aptitude to learn lan-
guage. Linguistic knowledge is constructed through a process of repre-
sentational re-description from the interaction between innate biases 
and environment. 
 Clearly, innate biases posited by constructivists are more flexible 
than innate constraints in strict nativist accounts. They can still be 
domain-specific though, since they orient attention on a certain type of 
data. Studies in cognitive psychology suggest that infants are cogni-
tively predisposed to interpret the world in terms of agents and 
objects.66 But the innate biases that an infant possesses enable flexibil-
ity, since they do not determine the final state. They are thus perfectly 
compatible with and even necessary for the emergence of new struc-
tures: they are likely to be modified. Initial beliefs about the world 
upon interaction with the environment produce an understanding that 
will entail their reassessment. Infants come to the world with some 
biases, which they use to give meaning to their experience and to make 
some predictions; during development, they become able to compare 
their early predictions with their further experiences and then to 
improve them by producing more precise expectations.67 
 William James, who is known to be the first to apply plasticity to 
behaviour, has expressed this meaning of plasticity in precise terms: 
Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of a 
structure weak enough to yield to an influence but strong enough not to 
yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a 
structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits.68
According to James, plasticity is the condition for developing a new set 
of habits. However, the rejection of the notion of a predetermination of 
features often mobilizes a notion of plasticity as the capacity to acquire 
any possible form and to do so only through the action of the environ-
ment. But as noted earlier, plasticity is always constrained. Conversely, 
innateness need not be understood as complete determinism. It should 
be used to refer to a set of mechanisms and constraints that does not 
prefigure the end result of development but rather enables the construc-
tive process that will lead to the appearance of the trait. Plasticity and 
innateness can then both be defined as two facets of the same phenome-
non of determined flexibility.
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 Strictly speaking, it is then not possible to speak of ‘innate pheno-
typic traits’. Indeed, most traits co-vary with environmental factors and 
are the result of complex interactions between several developmental 
resources. Most phenotypic traits — morphological, behavioural, or 
concerning mental content — cannot be qualified as innate, since their 
appearance requires the intervention of multiple factors, of which only 
some are innate. These innate factors can be assimilated to some devel-
opmental resources within organisms, which through a complex inter-
action with other factors, make possible the developmental cascade 
leading to the appearance of a trait. Thus, innateness can mainly con-
cern the capacities or dispositions of organisms, not their forms or men-
tal content. The notion of capacity/disposition can embody this deter-
mined flexibility characteristic of development. It refers both to ranges 
of possibilities and to some specific end results that organisms are dis-
posed to acquire. A general capacity to acquire everything is not helpful 
in explaining development. 
 Innate capacities are the initial capacities that a satisfactory devel-
opmental explanation will attribute to an organism in order to render 
interaction with other developmental resources possible. Innate capaci-
ties are what enable the developmental process to produce its outcome 
in response to the environment. Thus, innateness belongs to the condi-
tion of explanation, as a capacity the organism must have to be able to 
develop a trait properly.69 From the point of view of ontogeny, the influ-
ence of some innate entities and operations appears to be necessary for 
development to occur. Innateness deals with starting capacities that can 
lead to several results.
I V .  C O N C L U S I O N
Acknowledging the significance of environmental influence in morpho-
logical and cognitive development and evolution in terms of epigenetics 
and plasticity should not be understood as saying that every outcome is 
possible. Plasticity is always constrained, and it requires developmental 
subroutines and mechanisms to built novel structures. Some of these 
mechanisms, once activated, act quite autonomously from environmen-
tal modification, while others are altered, for instance, with respect to 
dosage of expression. Epigenetics is concerned with the mediation of 
environmental influence and genomic resources resulting in plastic 
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responses. However, this mediation relies again on relatively robust 
mechanisms that translate environmental factors into molecular modi-
fiers of regulation. Thus, plasticity and its epigenetic mediation act 
through stable resources and robust mechanisms based on the stability 
of the content and structure of the genetic material. In this sense, they 
presuppose what can be called innate, or to a certain degree, genetically 
determined, elements. Conversely, innateness and genetic determination 
from this perspective are not understood as completely determining the 
outcome of development. Instead, they apply to some developmental 
resources and processes, mainly on the cellular level. Accordingly, we 
conclude that it is important to study the influence of the environment 
in biology, medicine, and the cognitive science and to move away from 
gene-centred explanations of evolutionary change, developmental pro-
cesses, and pathologies primarily in terms of mutation or gene action. 
We point out, however, that explanations of the outcome of develop-
ment and evolution will require reference to stable and robust features 
that are derived from the stability of the genome. The two cases of 
development and evolution of morphological form on the one hand and 
cognitive development and learning on the other hand, despite all dif-
ferences, point in the same direction in this respect.
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